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CaseNo.20090597-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Brian William Poundstone,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction on a guilty plea for aggravated
kidnaping, a first-degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

A. Did the trial court have any duty to inquire into Defendant's

competency where the record is devoid of any suggestion of a substantial question
of possible doubt as to his competency?
Standard of Review. Defendant did not preserve this claim below and argues
both plain error and exceptional circumstances.

To establish plain error, a

defendant must show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful[.]" See State v. Shaffer, 2010

UT App 240, If 10, 239 P.3d 285 (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,116,122 P.3d
543) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exceptional
circumstances exist only for the most unusual circumstances where the failure to
consider an unpreserved issue would result in manifest injustice. See State v.
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, If If 11,22,

P.3d

.

B. Did Defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when she
decided to forego a competency petition?
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^f 6, 89
P.3d 162.
2. Did the trial court violate rule 11(e) in taking Defendant's guilty plea?
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 in
taking a guilty plea presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 10, 983 P.2d 556. The "trial court's underlying factual
findings are reviewed for clear error." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, | 9,22 P.3d 1242
(citation omitted). However, no standard of review applies to this issue because it
was not preserved below, Defendant argues no exception to the preservation
requirement, and any error was invited by Defendant's trial counsel.

2

3. A. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea where the record shows that Defendant knew the maximum possible
sentence prior to entering his plea, and the court strictly complied with rule 11?
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard/' State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430,433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Lovell,
2010 UT 48, \ 5,

P.3d

. Findings of fact supporting the court's ruling are

reviewed for clear error. See Lovell, 2010 UT 48, % 5.
B. Did Defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to
pursue a ruling on the alleged rule 11(e) violations?
Standard of Review. " An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules are largely determinative of the issues addressed herein
and are attached in Addendum A:
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, a first-degree felony,
and aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. R. 2-3. At a status conference on
March 13, 2008, his appointed counsel asked for and received four weeks to file a
request for a competency evaluation of Defendant and to review discovery. R. 11; R.
176:6. A month later, when the judge asked for the status of the competency
evaluation, defense counsel informed him that she had "made a decision not to file
the request for a competency evaluation" because Defendant was "fully cognizant of
. . . ." R. 176:8. Counsel did not finish her explanation because the trial judge
interrupted and moved on to a discussion of the need for a preliminary hearing. Id.
Defendant waived a preliminary hearing, and the court bound him over as charged.
R. 18-19; R. 176:8.
The parties undertook negotiations, but ultimately required a trial setting. R.
24,29,34; R. 176:8-11. When they appeared for trial, defense counsel informed the
court that a plea agreement had been reached under which Defendant would plead
guilty to aggravated kidnapping and the State would seek dismissal of the
remaining charge.

R. 176:14; R. 80-81. The court undertook a colloquy with

Defendant in which he established that Defendant knew that the plea was not
required, that he had a right to a jury trial, and that he had a right to have his
4

attorney confront and cross-examine witnesses. R. 176:14 (a copy of the plea
colloquy is attached in Addendum B). He informed Defendant of his right to be
acquitted absent presentation by the State of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. R.
176:14-15. He also verified that Defendant had gone over the plea affidavit, read
and understood it, was aware that it contained all the rights he would give up by
entering the plea, and that the affidavit would forever signify his waiver of his
rights. R. 176:15 (a copy of the plea affidavit is attached in Addendum C). Defense
counsel stated the factual basis for the plea and noted that, although Defendant did
not agree with the facts, he agreed that not only would the State present those facts
at trial, but there was "a substantial risk of conviction" on those facts. R. 176:15-17.
Both the court and counsel articulated that the crime carried a potential sentence of
six, ten or fifteen years to life in prison, and the court noted that prison was
mandatory. R. 176:17. When asked, Defendant said he had no questions, executed
the plea affidavit in open court, and entered his guilty plea. Id. The court accepted
the plea and dismissed count two pursuant to the plea agreement. R. 80; R. 176:17.
The judge ordered preparation of a presentence report and set sentencing.l R. 80; R.
176:17-18.

1

No presentence report is contained in the appellate record.
5

Four days after entry of the plea, the court received a pro se letter from
Defendant seeking to withdraw his plea. R. 95. Defendant claimed that the facts on
which the plea was based were "not the real ones'7 and stated that he wanted to take
the case to trial or negotiate "some other kind of agreement." Id. Thereafter, his
counsel filed a formal motion to withdraw the plea, arguing that withdrawal was
warranted because the court had failed to strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in taking the plea. R. 113-18 (a copy is attached in Addendum
D). When the matter was argued on November 3,2008, defense counsel conceded
that the trial judge "did a really good job on [the] colloquy" and "asked every
question that needed to be asked." R. 176:31 (a transcript of the argument is
attached in Addendum E). She focused instead on her belief that Defendant did not
understand that the sentence included the possibility of a maximum life term. R.
176:31-32. Following argument, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced
Defendant to the recommended term of six-years-to-life in the State Prison. R. 122,
128; R. 176:32-33,37. Defendant's appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw
two months later. R. 132.
Defendant filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal in June 2009. R. 133-34; R.
176:39. At Defendant's request, this Court remanded the case for a determination of
indigency and, if necessary, appointment of counsel. R. 138; R. 176:39-40. The trial
6

court appointed counsel, who sought to perfect Defendant's direct appeal. R. 14548,161-63; R. 176:40-41,44-46. The trial court ultimately reinstated the period for
filing an appeal without opposition from the prosecutor, and Defendant ultimately
filed a second amended notice of appeal. R. 165,170-75; R. 176:45-46. The Utah
Supreme Court subsequently poured the appeal over to this Court. See Appellate
Docket.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant waived a preliminary hearing and entered a guilty plea shortly
thereafter. No presentence investigation report appears in the appellate record.
Consequently, the only facts presently before this Court are those underlying the
guilty plea, which Defendant agrees are the facts the State would present if the case
went to trial. R. 107; R. 176:15-16.
Those facts are that on February 2,2008, Defendant grabbed A.M., a juvenile,
in a headlock and pulled her into a room at an LDS church in Roosevelt. R. 107; R.
176-15-16. Closing the door behind them, he put his knife against A.M/s neck and
told her that if she stayed calm and did not move or say anything, she would not get
hurt. Id. He did so with the intent to inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize
her. R. 107. When an adult came into the room shortly thereafter, Defendant hid
the knife. R. 176:16. A.M. told the adult she needed to talk to her, and Defendant
7

fled. Id. He was followed by a member of the church and was arrested later the
same day. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte
inquire into his competency or to set a competency hearing, despite the absence of a
competency petition. Because the claim is unpreserved, he argues plain error,
exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance. To prevail, Defendant must
establish that there existed below a substantial question of doubt as to his
competency. Each of his arguments fail because the record makes no reference to
any of the information on which he relies to meet this burden. Similarly, the record
is inadequate to support his claim that the information was known either to the trial
court or to Defendant's trial counsel.
Point II. Defendant challenges the trial court's taking of his guilty plea.
However, he failed to object below to the incorporation of the plea affidavit or to the
trial court's discussion during the plea colloquy of a majority of the rights outlined
in rule 11(e). His failure to argue any exception to the preservation rule permits
rejection of his unpreserved arguments on appeal.
In any event, his trial counsel invited any error when, after presenting a rule
11 challenge in her written motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, she
8

conceded at argument that the court's plea colloquy included "every question that
needed to be asked" and represented that the "basis" for the withdrawal motion
was, instead, Defendant's alleged misunderstanding as to sentencing.
Finally, Defendant's challenge fails on its merits where the record
demonstrates that the trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit, and used
it in conjunction with the plea colloquy to address each of the matters challenged by
Defendant.
Point III. Defendant claims error in the trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Defendant
knew of the potential maximum sentence for the crime to which he pled guilty.
Defendant argues that the record does not demonstrate that he was advised "in
court" of the maximum possible sentence for aggravated kidnapping. However, the
record amply demonstrates that Defendant was informed of the fact outside the
courtroom prior to entering his plea. Moreover, the plea affidavit twice references
the maximum possible sentence, and both defense counsel and the trial court
articulated the information during the plea colloquy.
Defendant also claims error in the trial court's failure to reach his challenges
to the plea colloquy and ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel's
failure to pursue the claims below. The former argument fails for each of the
9

reasons set forth in Point II. His ineffective assistance claim fails because assertion
of the rule 11 claims by his trial counsel would have been futile in the absence of any
such error below.
ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE RECORD SUPPORT
FOR HIS CHALLENGE TO THE ABSENCE OF A COMPETENCY
EVALUATION DEFEATS HIS CLAIMS OF PLAIN ERROR AND
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when, after
defense counsel decided not to seek a competency evaluation, the court did not
require counsel to justify her decision and did not sua sponte either question
Defendant on his competency or set a competency hearing. See Aplt. Br. at 34-37.
He argues that his counsel's request for time to file a competency petition, together
with the "additional information7' known to the court about Defendant's
background and behavioral problems, created a substantial question of doubt as to
his competency which required the court to act sua sponte to resolve the competency
issue. See id. at 36-37. He also contends that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when she decided not to pursue a competency evaluation in the face of
his "substantial mental health issues[.]" Id. at 48-51.

10

This Court should reject Defendant's claim because he fails to establish that
anything in the record or at the plea hearing created a substantial question of
possible doubt about his competency. Accordingly, he cannot demonstrate that the
trial court plainly erred or that his counsel was ineffective on this point.2
A. The Record is Inadequate to Establish Either Plain Error or
Exceptional Circumstances
Defendant admits that he did not preserve his claim below and argues that it
should be reviewed under the plain error or exceptional circumstances exceptions to
the preservation rule. See Aplt. Br. at 37.
This Court reaches unpreserved issues under the exceptional circumstances
doctrine only in cases involving "rare procedural anomalies/' State v. Munguia, 2011
UT 5, | | 11, 22,

P.3d

(internal quotation marks omitted). However, the

2

Defendant's argument relies in part on a newspaper article he includes in
Addendum K of his brief. See Aplt. Br. at 35 & Add. K. That article is not properly
before this Court inasmuch as it was not made part of the record below, and
Defendant did not supplement the record with the article pursuant to rule 11, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, | 2, 75 P.3d 923
("An appellate court's 'review is ... limited to the evidence contained in the record
on appeal'" . . . and the record may not be supplemented with additional material
"by simply including the omitted material in the party's addendum.") (quoting State
v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, | 7,974 P.2d 279 (citation omitted)). In any event, the article is
irrelevant as it provides no information not otherwise included in the appellate
record.
11

exception is reserved only for the most unusual circumstances where the failure to
consider an unpreserved issue would result in manifest injustice. See id.
To establish plain error, a defendant must show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful[.]"
See State v. Shaffer, 2010 UT App 240, f 10,239 P.3d 285 (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005
UT 45, f 16,122 P.3d 543) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendant establishes neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances in the
trial court's failure to sua sponte question his competency. His argument assumes,
without supporting authority, that the trial court had a duty to inquire about
defense counsel's change of position on the issue of competency or to question
Defendant about the matter. Without identifying any source for such responsibility,
Defendant cannot establish plain error in the trial court's alleged breach of that
responsibility. See State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, | 7, 228 P.3d 1255 (requiring the
existence settled appellate law to guide the trial court at the time of the alleged error
before the error will be deemed to be obvious).
Moreover, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte schedule a competency
hearing under the facts of this case. Absent the filing of a petition, a trial court is
required to set a competency hearing only "when there is "a substantial question of
12

possible doubt as to a defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea/" State
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 49, 63 P.3d 731 (citation omitted); see also Jacobs v. State,
2001 UT 17, | 13, 20 P.3d 382. To determine whether a trial court erred by not
holding a competency hearing, "a reviewing court considers the facts that were
before the trial court when the plea was entered/7 See Jacob, 2001 UT 17, f 8. "The
fact that a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or
has a history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand
trial/7 Id. at If 16.
In this case, the record reflects nothing leading up to the entry of Defendant's
guilty plea that would raise "'a substantial question of possible doubt777 as to his
competency. The trial judge knew that defense counsel had considered filing a
competency petition, then changed her mind, although no reason for counsel's
actions appears in the record. R. 176:6,8. Defendant had appeared before the judge
numerous times by then, yet the record reflects nothing unusual about any of his
appearances. R. I76:passim. At the plea hearing, the judge listened as Defendant
responded appropriately to questions from the court, affirmed his understanding of
the written plea agreement, and acknowledged that he was knowingly and
voluntarily pleading guilty. R. 176:14-18. In addition, Defendant's trial counsel
signed the certificate attached to the written plea statement attesting to her belief
13

that Defendant had read the statement, fully understood its contents, and was
"mentally and physically competent/' R. 101. Nothing up to and including the plea
hearing sheds any additional light on Defendant's competency or raises any
question, let alone a substantial one, of possible doubt about his competency.
Defendant contends that a substantial question of law as to his competency
arose from information provided to his trial counsel and to the prosecutor and later
communicated to the judge. See Aplt. Br. at 35-37. The information allegedly
derived from meetings between Defendant and his trial counsel, from Duchesne
County Jail staff, from a police interview with Defendant's half-brother, and from a
twenty-two page fax. See id. at 16-20,35-36. The information supposedly detailed
Defendant's conduct at the county jail where he purportedly exhibited "volatile and
irrational behavior," masturbated constantly, and relentlessly bragged about his
Colorado juvenile court record which involved his abuse of his younger stepbrothers. Id. at 18-19,35. The information also included references to Defendant's
"long established behavior problems[,]" his "documented history of anger and
depression[,j" and his "lengthy juvenile placement and related problems." Id. at 1820,33,35-36.
Defendant's claim suffers from two insurmountable problems. The first is his
failure to provide any record support for the information on which he relies. See
14

State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307,309 (Utah 1985) (appellant has the burden of ensuring
that the record contains the materials, necessary to support his claims on appeal;
therefore, when an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the
Court must presume that the missing portions support the action of the district
court.). The record contains none of the documents identified by Defendant or any
evidence suggesting that the documents exist. Neither is there any reference in the
record to any of the specific information identified by Defendant. Even if some of
the information could be found in a presentence investigation report, no such report
is included in the appellate record, and it would not have been available to the
lower court at the time of the plea hearing, rendering its contents irrelevant to this
Court's review of this claim. See Jacobs, 2001 UT17, f 8 (reviewing only "the facts
that were before the trial court when the plea was entered").
Without a basis in the record to establish the existence of the information on
which Defendant's claim relies, the claim is entirely speculative and wholly
insufficient to establish plain error or any exceptional circumstance in the lower
court's handling of the competency issue.
The second flaw in Defendant's argument is his inability to establish that such
information ever reached the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 35-36. Defense counsel's
request for an opportunity to file a competency petition made no mention of
15

counsel's reasoning or of the information that prompted the request. R. 176:6. She
later decided not to file a competency petition, telling the judge she "made a
decision not to file the request for a competency evaluation[] because Mr.
Poundstone is fully cognizant of

" R. 176:8. Although the judge interrupted her

and did not return to the issue, counsel's comment demonstrates that she
considered the matter and affirmatively decided that an evaluation was not
warranted for a particular reason. Her conduct would reassure the trial court that
no question remained as to Defendant's competency, let alone a substantial one. No
other express reference to Defendant's competency appears in the record.
Defendant argues that the judge was necessarily "apprised of th[e] additional
information" behind his counsel's initial concern for his competency because when
the judge took the plea, he asked whether a psychosexual report was needed in this
case. Apit. Br. at 33,35-36. The record is silent, however, on the reasons behind the
comment. The question may have been prompted by something other than the
information identified by Defendant, including the judge's routine when taking a
guilty plea, information relating solely to Defendant's juvenile criminal history, or
the fact that Defendant was originally charged in the alternative with intending to
commit a sexual offense. R. 2-3.

In any event, Defendant's claim is purely

16

speculative and does not establish that the judge had any information before it that
raised a substantial question of law as to Defendant's competency.
Finally, even if the information alleged by Defendant had been provided to
the trial court prior to entry of the guilty plea, the judge's failure to inquire into
Defendant's competence would not have amounted to plain error because the
information is insufficient to raise a substantial question as to Defendant's
competency. The information involved Defendant's criminal record, his constant
masturbation, and his 'Volatile and irrational behavior[.]" Aplt. Br. at 35. Such
information does not necessarily mean that Defendant was incompetent and, hence,
would not establish obvious error in the court's failure to sua sponte embark on a
competency inquiry. See Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 16 (bizarre behavior alone does not
present a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's competency so
as to require a judge to sua sponte set a competency hearing).
Accordingly, this Court should reject Defendant's unsupported, self-serving
claims relating to his mental competence.

17

B. The Inadequate Record Defeats Defendant's Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
actually file a competency petition after having requested time to do so.3 See Aplt.
Br. at 48-51. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must "show that
counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, Tf 13,

P.3d

. "[A] court must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101,76
S.Ct. 158) (emphasis added); State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 39,55 R3d 1134, cert
den'd 63 P.3d 104 (Utah Jan. 13,2003). To establish prejudice, Defendant must prove
that "counsel's errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense and that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ^ 40, 247 P.3d 344 (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, Utah v. Ott,
3

S. Ct.

, 2011 WL 589441

This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel appears in Defendant's brief at
Point 4 . See Aplt. Br. at 48-51.
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(Utah Feb. 22, 2011); C.D.L., 2011 UT 55, \ 13. "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome/' Taylor v. State, 2007
UT 12,1f 56,156 P.3d 739 (internal quotation marks omitted), reh'g den'd (3/27/07).
'"Additionally, proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative
matter but must be a demonstrable reality/" See Munguia, 2011 UT 5,130 (quoting
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, f 36,203 P.3d 976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as a matter of law. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, 697; C.D.L., 2011 UT 55, f 13; Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 1 38. "Given the
arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant's claim fails because it relies entirely on the existence of
information which does not appear in the appellate record. He claims his counsel
was deficient because she failed to file a competency petition despite her knowledge
of Defendant's behavior problems, his "history of anger and depression[,]" and the
multiple meetings between counsel and Defendant during which they discussed his
victimization as a youth and his juvenile court experience. See Aplt. Br. at 48-49.
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However, neither the information nor trial counsel's knowledge of it is
substantiated in the record.4 See Point IA, supra.
Further, Defendant claims that his counsel's conduct was prejudicial because
even if an alienist deemed him to be competent, he "would most likely have been"
diagnosed as suffering from "a substantial mental illness" such as "severe
depression" and could have been "properly medicated" and could possibly have
pled guilty and mentally ill. See Aplt. Br. at 50. However, the record is devoid of
any of the information necessary to demonstrate that Defendant suffers from, or is
likely to be diagnosed as having, severe depression or any other "substantial
mental illness." See id. Even Defendant's single reference to having been on
medication—made at sentencing—was not given any context as to time, type, or
purpose. R. 176:36.
Defendant carries the burden of not only establishing his claim of ineffective
assistance, but of assuring that "the record is adequate" to support his claim. See
C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, Tf 39 (citing State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f f 16-17,19,12
P.3d 92). Where he is aware of "any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully
4

Defendant also notes that he informed his counsel that he had been "off his
medications for many months." Aplt. Br. at 49. That information does not appear in
the record until sentencing, and nothing in the record reveals that Defendant's trial
counsel knew the information prior to his entry of his guilty plea. R. 176:36.
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appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support" his ineffectiveness
claim, he has the opportunity to attempt to develop the necessary record. See C.D.L.,
2011 UT App 55, % 39; Utah R. App. P. 23B. Defendant made no attempt to avail
himself of that opportunity in this case.

Consequently, the record remains

inadequate to support his purely speculative assertions, and this Court must
construe the record in favor of a "finding that counsel performed effectively" in
deciding not to petition for a competency hearing. See C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, f 42;
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17 ("[w]here the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of
a finding that counsel performed effectively.").
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAKING DEFENDANTS
GUILTY PLEA WHERE THE COURT PROPERLY
INCORPORATED THE PLEA AFFIDAVIT INTO THE RECORD
AND STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH RULE 11(E) THROUGH
BOTH THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE COLLOQUY
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11,
Utah Rules of Evidence, when it took his guilty plea. See Aplt. Br. at 37-43. He
faults the judge on three points: (1) failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e); (2)
failure to properly incorporate the plea affidavit into the record; and (3) failure to
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properly establish that Defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the plea
affidavit and, hence, knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. See id. at 38.
A. Appellate Review is Unwarranted Because Defendant's Rule
11 Claims are Largely Unpreserved, and, in Any Event, His
Counsel Invited any Error
Defendant alleges a number of errors in the taking of his guilty plea, none of
which warrant appellate review. Defendant raised several of the alleged errors
below, but then sought a ruling based solely on Defendant's understanding of the
maximum possible sentence, thereby inviting any error in the trial court's failure to
address the abandoned claims. The remaining appellate claims are not properly
before this Court for review because they were not preserved below, and Defendant
argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances. Moreover, defense
counsel's conduct below invited any error in the taking of Defendant's plea, again
preventing appellate review.
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court did not properly
incorporate the plea affidavit into the record and that the judge failed to establish
that Defendant had read, understood and acknowledged the document. See Aplt.
Br. at 38,40-41. He also claims that the affidavit itself contains numerous errors. See
id. at 41-42. Finally, he claims that the plea colloquy was deficient because the judge
failed to inform Defendant of, or inquire about, the following:
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His right to the presumption of innocence;
His right against compulsory self-incrimination;
His right to compel defense witnesses;
His understanding of the nature of the elements of the subject offense;
His right to have the State prove at trial each element beyond a reasonable
doubt;
His understanding that the guilty plea would admit all the elements or would
represent his belief that the State's evidence presented a substantial risk of
conviction;
His knowledge that the plea resulted from prior plea discussions in which a
plea agreement involving sentencing was reached;
The fact that the sentencing recommendations were not binding on the court;
The fact that a motion to withdraw the plea had to be filed prior to sentencing
and may or may not be granted;
The fact that the plea would limit his right of appeal;
Whether his plea was voluntarily made;
Whether he was under the influence of any substance or was being treated for
mental health issues;
Whether he was satisfied with his counsel;
Whether he had reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel and
understood it; and
Whether he had been pressured or threatened by anyone to enter the plea.
23

See id. at 39-40.
Defendant raised significantly fewer claims below. In his written motion to
withdraw the guilty plea, his counsel summarily claimed only that the court:
•

Failed to inform Defendant of the elements of the crime to which he pleaded
guilty;

•

Failed to inform him that he would not be allowed to appeal his conviction
based upon his guilty plea;

•

Failed to inform him that he could ask to withdraw his plea prior to
sentencing; and

•

Never established that the plea was voluntarily entered.

R. 114. Defense counsel later verbally presented the trial court with an additional
claim: Defendant's failure to understand that he faced a possible maximum
sentence of life in prison. R. 176: 20,32.
1. Defendant Failed to Preserve the Majority of his Claims
A comparison of these two lists reveals that the majority of Defendant's
claimed deficiencies in the taking of his guilty plea were not preserved below and,
hence, are not properly before this Court for appellate review. "[A] timely and
specific objection must be made [in the trial court] in order to preserve an issue for
appeal/' State v. Finder, 2005 UT15, % 45,114 P.3d 551, reh'g den'd (6/1/05); State v.
Rangei, 866 P.2d 607,611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must 'be specific enough
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to give the trial court notice of the very error' of which [the party] complains." State
v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills
Water Co., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App.1996)) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this
Court should refuse to review Defendant's unpreserved claims of error unless
Defendant can establish an exception to the preservation requirement. See Finder,
2005 UT 15, % 45 (an appellate court reviews an unpreserved claim only if the party
" articulate [s] an appropriate justification for appellate review," such as plain error
or exceptional circumstances); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, \ 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 1062
("When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will nevertheless review the
issue if the appealing party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional
circumstances."); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346 (the preservation rule
"applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred").
Defendant's failure to address any such exception in his argument justifies
summary rejection of his unpreserved claims. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^f 51
(declining to review a claim for plain error or exceptional circumstances when
neither was raised in the opening brief).

He references both plain error and

exceptional circumstances in the "Statement of Issues" at the beginning of his brief.
See Aplt. Br. at 4. However, his argument references only the appellate standard of
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review for a preserved rule 11 claim, with no mention of any exception to the
preservation requirement and no attempt to establish that the unpreserved claims of
error were either obvious or harmful. See id. at 37-43. Consequently, this Court
should decline to review his unpreserved claims on appeal.
2. Defendant Invited any Error in the Taking of his Plea When
he Conceded the Thoroughness of the Colloquy Below
This Court may also refuse to review Defendant's claims, including those
preserved in his motion below, under the doctrine of invited error. That doctrine
permits this Court to decline "to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she
had no objection." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quotations and
citation omitted), cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah Apr. 22, 2010). This "arises from
the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when
that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id. at % 15. It also
"discourage[s] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve
a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. Thus, where counsel "confirm[s] on
the record that the defense had no objection" or "fail[s] to object . . . when
specifically queried by the court," the invited error doctrine bars plain error review.
See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,110, 86 P.3d 742.
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Here, after focusing the trial court's attention on the sufficiency of the plea
colloquy and the voluntariness of the plea, defense counsel narrowed her claims of
error to a single claim: Defendant's failure to understand the potential maximum
sentence for aggravated kidnapping. Twice, when addressing her written motion in
open court, defense counsel conceded that, after she listened to the tape of the
August plea hearing, she believed the trial judge "did a very good job going over
the issues ... that are required to be addressed" in taking a guilty plea and that the
judge "asked every question that needed to be asked." R. 176:19, 31. She argued
instead that, despite the court's thoroughness in the taking of the plea, Defendant
did not understand that his sentence had a potential maximum term of "life" in
prison. R. 176:20-22, 32. That issue, she explained, was "really the basis for the
motion to have his guilty plea withdrawn." R. 176:32. The trial judge understood as
much because when he denied the motion, he spoke only to his belief that
Defendant should have been aware of the maximum sentence and commenting that
Defendant may yet be released in less than the six-year minimum applicable to his
plea. R. 176:33.
Defense counsel's argument effectively informed the court that Defendant no
longer had any objection to the sufficiency of the plea colloquy or to the plea
affidavit and, instead, focused the court's attention solely on Defendant's claimed
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misunderstanding about the possible maximum sentence. Consequently, counsel
invited any error in the trial court's failure to address any other claims involving
rule 11(e) compliance.5 See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14 (the invited error doctrine
precludes even plain error review on appeal); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah
1997) (holding that, "'[i]f a party through counsel. . . has led the trial court into
error, [this Court] will then decline to save that party from the error7") (quoting State
v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155,158 (Utah 1989)) (emphasis omitted).
B. Defendant's Claim Fails on its Merits
In any event, there was no error, let alone obvious error, in the taking of
Defendant's plea below because the court not only properly incorporated the plea
affidavit into the record, but the affidavit and the colloquy combined to strictly
comply with rule 11.
Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 "may be demonstrated
on appeal by reference to the record of the plea proceedings/' State v. Maguire, 830
P.2d 216,217 (Utah 1992). The record may reflect the trial court's compliance with
rule 11 by "multiple means, e.g., transcript of the oral colloquy between the court
5

Defendant does not address the invited error doctrine, but argues in Point 3
of his brief that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she did not
assert his rule 11 complaints at oral argument below. See Aplt. Br. at 43-44. The
State responds to his argument in Point III, infra.
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and defendant, contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read,
understood, and acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other
documents such as the information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., similarly
incorporated into the record and so on." Id. at 218. However,
. . . if an affidavit is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be
addressed during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit and
voluntarily signed it
Any omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit
must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties
raised in the course of the plea colloquy. Then the affidavit itself,
signed by the required parties, can be incorporated into the record.
Id. at 217-18 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App. 1991)).
In other words, when an affidavit has been properly incorporated into the
record, "the trial court need not 'perform a verbatim recitation of each and every
statement in the defendant's affidavit'" in order to comply with rule 11. State v.
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1161 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814
P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)). Rather, the
trial court may rely on a properly incorporated affidavit in complying with the
requirements of rule 11. Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160-61.
To properly incorporate a plea affidavit into the colloquy, '"[t]he trial court
must conduct an inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the affidavit
and voluntarily signed it/" and must clarify omissions and ambiguities in the
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affidavit and uncertainties which are raised in the colloquy. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217
(quoting Smith, 812 P.2d at 477).
1. The Trial Court Properly Incorporated the Plea Affidavit
Defendant claims that the trial court did not properly incorporate the plea
affidavit into the record because the judge failed to establish that Defendant had
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the plea affidavit. See Aplt. Br.
at 40-41. A fair reading of the plea colloquy refutes that claim.
The transcript demonstrates that the trial judge not only expressly confirmed
that Defendant had "gone over" the plea affidavit, but inquired whether he had in
fact "read" it and whether he understood it. R. 176:15. Defendant gave an
unequivocal "yes" response to each question. Id. The judge reviewed several
"primary rights" with Defendant that were contained within the plea affidavit,
including his right to a jury trial, his right to call and cross-examine witnesses, his
right to appeal his conviction, and his right to have the jury convict him only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare R. 176:14-15 with R. 105-06. The judge
explained to Defendant that the plea affidavit explained "all of the rights that [he
was] giving up" by pleading guilty, including not only the rights that were being
discussed in court, but also "many others[.]" R. 176:15. The judge admonished
Defendant that the written agreement would, in effect, be conclusive notice that he
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gave up the rights outlined therein. Id. He then asked Defendant if he understood
the explanation, to which Defendant responded, "Yes." Id. The judge proceeded to
establish the factual basis for the plea, reviewed the potential sentence, and then
watched as Defendant executed the written plea agreement. R. 176:15-17. He then
asked Defendant if he had any questions and, receiving a negative response, had
him enter his plea. R. 176:17. This formed a basis from which the trial could
conclude that Defendant had read and understood the contents of the affidavit.
In addition, the plea agreement provides that Defendant and his attorney
"fully discussed this statement, [Defendant's] rights, and the consequences of [his]
guilty plea(s)." R. 106. Further, the six paragraphs preceding Defendant's signature
on the plea affidavit provide that: the plea is the result of Defendant's "own free
will and choice [;]" he was not coerced into entering it; he had read the affidavit and
understood its contents; he had made all the changes he wished to make; he was
satisfied with his counsel's advice and assistance; he could read and understand
English; his judgment was not impaired by drugs, medication, or intoxicants; he
was of sound mind and was mentally able to understand the proceedings and their
consequences; and he was aware both of the need to seek withdrawal of his plea
prior to sentencing if he wished and of the fact that it would be granted only upon a
showing that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. R. 102-03. This
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reinforces the trial court's determination that Defendant had read and understood
the contents of the affidavit.
Finally, Defendant contends that the plea affidavit contains errors which were
left uncorrected by the trial court. See Aplt. Br. at 41-42. He argues that: (1) the
affidavit should have provided for a "no contest" or Alford plea because Defendant
did not agree with the underlying facts but simply agreed that the State could obtain
a conviction on those facts; (2) the affidavit reflects an erroneous offense date of
February 2 instead of March 2; and (3) the aggravated kidnapping elements in the
affidavit reflect a sexually-related alternative intent that was unsupported by the
factual basis for the plea. See id. His argument fails, however, because it was not
preserved for appeal and, in any event, none of his points amounts to reversible
error.
First, the trial court is charged with clarifying omissions, ambiguities and
uncertainties in the affidavit which are raised during the plea hearing. See Maguire,
830 P.2d at 217. Defendant brought none of the alleged errors in the affidavit to the
court's attention during the hearing. Neither did he raise any in his motion to
withdraw his plea. Accordingly, he gave the lower court no opportunity to correct
or clarify the alleged errors.

Neither does he argue any exception to the

preservation rule on appeal. Hence, the matter is not properly before this Court for
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review. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 51 (declining to review issue not raised below
when appellant did not argue "that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error'
justifies a review of the issue"); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)
(same).
Second, none of the allegations amount to error. The parties did not negotiate
for a no contest or Alford plea, and nothing prevented them from agreeing to a guilty
plea grounded on a belief that the State's facts were likely to result in a conviction
following a trial. See generally Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (noting that the requisite factual
basis for entry of a plea of guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill must
demonstrate either that the accused "actually committed" the charged crime "or...
that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction") (emphasis added). Consequently, the absence of a reference to a no
contest or Alford plea does not establish error in the plea affidavit.6

6

Defendant's argument also faults the trial court for failing "to establish" that
Defendant understood and agreed with the notation added to the plea affidavit
noting that the recited facts are what the State would prove at trial, not what
Defendant agreed he actually did. Aplt. Br. at 41 (referring to R. 107). The court had
no such duty, however, in view of the affirmative representation by Defendant's
trial counsel during the plea colloquy that "Mr. Poundstone doesn't agree with the
way the facts are [stated], but we agree that that's the way the State would present
the facts at trial . . . [and that they present] a substantial risk of conviction." R.
176:15-16. Defendant made no effort to correct counsel's statement. Id.
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Neither is the February 2 offense date reflected in the plea affidavit erroneous.
The March 2 date noted by Defendant is the date reflected in the information for the
aggravated assault charge (Count 2), which was dismissed as a result of the plea
agreement. R. 2. February 2 is the date reflected in the information for the
aggravated kidnapping offense for which Defendant entered his plea.

R. 3.

Accordingly, use of the February 2 date in the plea affidavit, as well as during the
plea colloquy, is not error. R. 107; R. 176:15-16.
Finally, the inclusion of an alternative intent element in the plea affidavit did
not prevent the trial court from properly incorporating the affidavit into the record.
The State charged Defendant with aggravated kidnapping, including in the
information two alternative intents derived from the charging statute: an intent "to
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or. . . [an intent] to
commit a sexual offense

" R. 3. The plea affidavit reflected the same elements,

expressed in the disjunctive, using the same language from the charging statute. R.
107. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(b) (West Supp. 2010).
Defendant

contends that inclusion of the alternative intent was

"objectionable" because it was irrelevant to his plea, but he fails to establish that its
inclusion amounted to reversible error. Aplt. Br. at 42. The factual recitation that
follows the elements in the affidavit clearly establishes that Defendant acted "with
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intent to inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize her." R. 107. Nothing in the
affidavit or in the plea colloquy brought that element into doubt. Defendant did not
claim to harbor any other intent, and he does not suggest that he was mislead or
confused by inclusion of the alternative intent language. Under the facts at hand,
the challenged language was mere surplusage that had no impact on Defendant's
understanding of the plea affidavit, did not render the affidavit ambiguous or
uncertain, and did not prevent incorporation of the plea affidavit into the record.
In sum, the trial court confirmed in a meaningful colloquy that Defendant had
read the plea affidavit, had reviewed it with his counsel, and was aware of its
essential contents. See Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18. In the course thereof, Defendant
unequivocally assured the court that he had in fact read the document and
understood its contents and that he had no questions concerning the agreement or
its contents. Further, he demonstrated no uncertainty or indecision in executing the
agreement in open court. That was sufficient to incorporate the plea affidavit into
the record for purposes of determining rule 11 compliance. See, e.g., Penman, 964
P.2d at 1160-61 (plea affidavit could properly be used in conjunction with plea
colloquy to determine strict rule 11 compliance).
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2. The Plea Colloquy, Together with the Plea Affidavit,
Achieved Strict Compliance with Rule 11
Between the trial court's colloquy and Defendant's thorough plea affidavit,
Defendant was fully apprised of his rights as required by rule 11. The colloquy
itself did not extend to all the requirements of rule 11(e), but the trial judge made
clear that he was accepting and entering the plea in accordance with the agreement
based both on the colloquy and on the plea agreement itself. R. 176:17. The plea
affidavit included every constitutional right challenged by Defendant on appeal.
Corn-pare Aplt. Br. at 37-42 with R. 101-08. It also set forth each of the elements of
aggravated kidnapping and summarized the conduct by Defendant that fulfilled
those elements, notwithstanding Defendant's claim to the contrary. R. 107.
Because the record demonstrates that the trial court strictly complied with
rule 11, this Court should reject Defendant's contrary claim.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, he argues that his failure to
understand the maximum possible sentence for aggravated kidnapping justified
withdrawal of his plea absent proof of prejudice to the State. See Aplt. Br. at 45-47.
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He then claims that withdrawal should have been granted because the trial court
failed to properly incorporate the plea affidavit into the record, failed to comply
with rule 11(e), and failed to establish that his plea was knowing and voluntary. See
id. at 47-48. Finally, he argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by submitting the withdrawal motion to the trial court on the sentencing issue
alone. See id. at 43-44,47-48.
A, The Record Reflects that Defendant Understood the Maximum
Possible Sentence
Defendant first contends that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea
because he did not understand that the crime to which he was pleading guilty
carried a potential sentence of up to life in prison. See id. at 45-46. He argues that he
was not advised in court of the maximum sentence until the plea hearing when he
discovered that the plea affidavit twice mentioned the fact. See id. at 45-47. This
was insufficient, he argues, because the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated
into the record and the record belies the statements of both the prosecutor and the
judge that they had previously advised Defendant on the record of the potential for
a life sentence. Id.
Regardless of when Defendant was first advised of the fact "on the record/'
he was in fact informed of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing. His trial
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counsel admitted that she had informed him of that fact, albeit not every time they
spoke of sentencing. R. 176:32 (counsel admits she "didn't always every time [she]
spoke with [Defendant] say 6 to life, 6 to life."). She also stated, that "several times
from the beginning of this lawsuit Mr. Poundstone has been advised, told, reminded
that he was looking at potentially a life sentence[.]" R. 176:22.
Further, the trial judge believed that Defendant "was aware of" the maximum
sentence, noting that it had most recently been mentioned during a discussion on
sentencing held in his chambers immediately prior to the plea hearing. R. 176:33.
Although the in-chambers meeting does not appear to have been either reported or
transcribed, the record demonstrates that the parties made no effort to challenge the
judge's statement, and it contains nothing to contradict it. Hence, this Court should
presume the veracity of the judge's reasoning. See Tlteison, 709 P.2d at 309 (when an
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the Court must presume
that the missing portions support the action of the district court).
In any event, the plea affidavit and the colloquy alerted Defendant to the
maximum possible sentence before he entered his plea. The first page of the plea
affidavit expressly provides that the potential sentence for aggravated kidnapping is
"6, 10, or 15 years and could be for life in the USP[.]" R. 108. Thereafter, the
affidavit explains that, as part of the plea bargain, "[t]he State agreed to recommend
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that the defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than six (6)
years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison/7 R. 104. The affidavit included
"Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness" which specifically stated that
Defendant had read the affidavit or had it read to him, understood its contents, and
adopted each statement. R. 103; R. 176:17.
In addition, defense counsel and the trial judge both verbally stated at the
plea hearing that the potential sentence was "6,10 or 15 to life/' R. 176:17. The
judge asked Defendant immediately thereafter if he understood the potential
sentence, to which Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Id. Only then did the court
have Defendant execute the plea affidavit and enter the guilty plea. Id.
In light of the record evidence that Defendant had been informed of and
understood the appropriate indeterminate sentence, his claim to the contrary
necessarily fails.
B. The Record Reflects no Errors in the Taking of Defendant's
Plea; Alternatively, Defense Counsel Invited Any Error
Defendant also contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea based on the judge's failure to properly incorporate the
plea affidavit into the record and to otherwise strictly comply with rule 11(e) in the
taking of the plea. See Aplt. Br. at 44-45,48. This claim fails for the reasons set forth
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in Point II, supra. Not only did the trial judge properly incorporate the affidavit and
strictly comply with rule 11(e), but any error that might be found was invited by
trial counsel's argument to the trial court that withdrawal of the plea turned on the
sole issue of Defendant's understanding of the maximum possible sentence. See
Point II, supra.
G Defense Counsel was not Ineffective for Failing to Pursue a
Futile Claim
Defendant attempts to salvage his rule 11 arguments by alleging that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue them below. See Aplt.
Br. at 43-44,47-48, 51. His claim, however, is inadequately briefed.
The rules of appellate procedure require a party to set forth the "contentions
and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "An argument
that does not contain 'reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority' is
inadequately briefed and we will not consider the issue." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT
App 170,«f15 n.l, 72 P.3d 138.
Here, Defendant's discussion of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness appears
without citation to any authority setting forth the standards for an ineffective
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assistance of counsel claim, let alone an explanation as to how those standards apply
to his claim under the facts at hand. See Aplt. Br. at 43-44,47-48. Such authority is,
instead, presented in Point 4 of Defendant's brief, but that Point does not address
defense counsel's failure to pursue a ruling on his rule 11 claims. See id. at 48-51.
Neither does Defendant make any reference to Strickland's prejudice prong. See id.
at 43-44, 47-48. This leaves it to the State and, ultimately, this Court to determine
how Strickland's two-pronged analysis applies in this particular legal context. "This
approach to appellate advocacy flies in the face of our oft-repeated reminder that
the appellate courts of this state are not a depository in which the appealing party
may dump the burden of argument and research/' State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231,
Tf 2, 238 P.3d 1103. This Court should therefore decline to address Defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Point 4 of Defendant's brief deals largely with his claim that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in dealing with the competency issue. See Aplt. Br.
at 48-51. The only other claim presented in Point IV consists of a single sentence: "It
se[e]ms clear also that Tr[ia]l Counsel should have properly objected to the denial of
the Motion to Withdraw Guilty plea following the Trial Court's summary denial of
the motion." Id. at 51. Because the statement is made without clarification or
support and contains no corresponding argument of prejudice, it is inadequately
briefed, and this Court need not review it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a); Sloan, 2003 UT
App 170, If 15 n.l (an issue lacking reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal
authority is inadequately briefed and will not be considered on appeal).
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In any event, the claim fails on its merits. As established in Point II, supra, the
trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit into the record and strictly
complied with rule 11(e), having properly incorporated and relied, in part, on the
plea affidavit in accepting the plea.

Accordingly, any additional effort by

Defendant's trial counsel to pursue a challenge based on the rule 11 claims would
have been futile, defeating Defendant's ineffective assistance claim. See State v.
Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, Tf 119, 24, 227 P.3d 1264 (no ineffectiveness in failing to
make futile motions or objections), cert denied 238 P.3d 443 (Utah July 27,2010); State
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, t 34, 989 P.2d 52 (same).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted Marcher \ 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

~^¥$$C. LEONARD y^
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addendum A

(2 screens)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
K
B Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
•HRULE 1 1 . PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail
shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel,
of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until
the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these
rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these
factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty
and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion
under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as

defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea,
it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not
render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by
the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
( i ) ( l ) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(0(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty,
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the
adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw
the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code
Ann 5 77-16a-103.
(!) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole Any variance from the procedures
required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not,
by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; April 1,
2005; November 1, 2005; January 1, 2008 ]

Rules App.Proc, Rule 24
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
H Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
H Title V. General Provisions
#RULE 24. BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part
of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief
under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
( a ) ( l l ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: •
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:

(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to
the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed,
the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except
with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used
in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the
employee," "the injured person/ "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule l l f f l or l l f q ) . References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall
be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall
not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving crossappeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply
to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant
(9)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule The motion shall state with specificity the
«ssues to be bne f ed, the number of add't'o^a1 pages requested, a^d t h e good cause fo«- granting t^e m otion. A motion f»*ed
at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional
pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection If the motion is granted, any responding
party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court Whether the motion is granted
or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words Any response shall be made within 7 days of
filing and shall be similarly limited
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged
with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer.
CREDIT(S)

[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003;
November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 2006; April 1, 2008.]
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THE COURT: Next case is Brian William Poundstone.
MS. MIYA:

Your Honor, this matter was set for trial

and the State had to continue because of a witness problem.

We

actually have resolved the matter and Mr. Poundstone will be
pleading today.

We've got paperwork.

THE COURT:
MS. MIYA:

What is proposed?
In exchange for Mr. Poundstone's guilty

plea to Count 1, the felony aggravated kidnapping, the State
has agreed to dismiss Count 2 and we actually -- well, Count 2
will be dismissed upon Mr. Poundstone's accepting Count 1.
Mr. Poundstone will need a presentence report.
THE COURT:

Okay.

you don't have to do this?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Mr. Poundstone, are you aware that
That you can have a jury trial?

Yes, your Honor.

And by entering into this plea agreement

you will not get to have that trial.

You give up your right to

have your lawyer confront and cross-examine witnesses.

You're

giving up your right to appeal if convicted?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

You're giving up your right to have you

in here in civilian clothes.
in custody.

The jury won't know that you're

I will instruct your jury that if any of them had

a reasonable doubt after the State's evidence, they should not
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

vote to convict you.

Those are the primary rights that you are

giving up.
There's an affidavit in advance of guilty plea.
paperwork there on the podium.

Have you gone over that?

The
Have

you read it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

that you're giving up.

That explains all of the rights

In addition to the ones we've talked

about there are many others there.

You should understand if

you sign that document, it will be put in your file and it will
be noticed to anyone that looks in there that you've given up
all those rights.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

What's the factual basis here?

What

happened?
MS. MIYA:

What we're going to do, your Honor, is we

agreed that the State -- the facts that the State presents are
the ones that they would use if we were to go to trial.
Mr. Poundstone doesn't agree with the way the facts are, but we
agree that that's the way the State would present the facts at
trial.
MR. CHARLES:

The facts the State is relying on, your

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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Honor, is that on February 2nd of this year Mr. Poundstone
followed the victim, a juvenile, whose initials are AM into a
church here in Roosevelt.

After following her, I don't know

how far in the church, he got her in a headlock, pulled her
into one of the rooms off the side of the hallway.

While he

was doing that he was holding a knife to her throat.

He told

her to sit down in a chair in the room that he drug her into
and closed the door and told her to sit there and she wouldn't
get hurt.
After a small amount of time passed an adult came
into the room, saw the two of them there.
knife.
her.

He put away the

The juvenile told this adult that she needed to talk to

Mr. Poundstone fled the scene. A member there at the

church followed him and eventually Officer Tucker found him
that same day.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Miya, you were aware of the

facts involved in preparing for trial in this case.

Do you

believe looking at the State's evidence that there is -- if the
facts were reasonably believed by a jury, that there is a
substantial chance of conviction?
MS. MIYA:

I believe that, yes, your Honor.

believe there's a substantial risk of conviction.

I

It's not 100

percent but -THE COURT:
MS. MIYA:

Well, it's never 10 0 percent.
But it's high, but, yes, there's a

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

substantial risk.

Mr. Poundstone has -- we've spent a lot of

time talking about the risks of going to trial, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Is prison mandatory, Mr. Charles?

MR. CHARLES:

I'm sorry, your Honor.

I was -- oh,

prison is mandatory, yes.
THE COURT:

And before I take your plea,

Mr. Poundstone, I need to advise you of that.

First-degree

felony could impose a zero, excuse me, five to life sentence.
MS. MIYA:

This one, your Honor, is a 6, 10 or 15 to

life.
THE COURT:

6, 10 or 15 to life, okay.

You

understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
affidavit.

Yes, sir.

I'll have you sign off on that plea

Mr. Poundstone, do you have any questions?

THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

To the charge in Count 1 of the

Information aggravated kidnapping, a first-degree felony, on or
about February 2nd, 2008, what is your plea?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

Based on the plea and the plea agreement,

the Court will dismiss Count 2 in its entirety.
this to Adult Probation and Parole.
assist us in sentencing.

I will refer

I'll get a report to

You think a psychosexual evaluation

is appropriate here?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

MR. CHARLES:

We had talked about that, Ms. Miya and

I, your Honor, and initially I was going to ask for one and
decided where prison is mandatory he'll be in therapy there. I
think that they'll be able to figure it out and if they need
one later, can get it there from the prison.
THE COURT:

Okay.

this, refer it to AP&P.
to you.

Let's get a sentencing date on

They'll come over to the jail and talk

Cooperate with them and we'll get this (inaudible.)
Set it for sentencing October 23rd.

Thank you.

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 081000069

vs.
BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE,

Judge John R. Anderson
Defendant
L Brian William Poundstone, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s):
Crime & Statutory
Provision

ravated Kidnapping

Degree

First Degree Felony-

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
6, 10, or 15 years and could be
for life in the USP
and/or $10,000 fine

I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me,
and I understand the nature and the elements of crimes to which I am pleading guilty.

0uLi 0 U

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are:
Aggravated Kidnapping - a First Degree Felony
That on or about February 2, 2008, in Duchesne County, State of Utah, in violation of
Section 76-5-3024 UCA (1953) as amended, the defendant did, in the course of committing
unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a) possess, use, or threaten to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) acted with intent:
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4 of the Utah
Code (Sexual Offenses).
THE VICTIM IS: A.M. DOB 02/26/1994

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept
my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty:
Aggravated Kidnapping - a First Degree Felony
That on or about February 2, 2008, in Duchesne County, State of Utah, I grabbed A.M.
and pulled her into a room at the LDS church. I put my knife against her neck and told her to
stay calm and don't move or say anything and she wouldn't get hurt. I did this with intent to
inflict bodily injury on A.M. or to terrorize her.

n0 -{o^Yidi .
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up
all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me.
I have not waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime to which I am pleading guilty. I
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Stephanie K. Miya. My attorney
and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b)
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to crossexamine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.

OGuiOt

Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. If I choose to
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be
admitting that I committed the crime stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory
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penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading
guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences
would be inappropriate.

Plea bargain. My guilty plea is a result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are
fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
1. The defendant will plead guilty as charged to Count 1, Aggravated Kidnapping, a
First Degree Felony.
2. The State agrees to recommend that the defendant be sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not less than six (6) years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison.
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the judge.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those
contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
lam

years of age. I have attended school through the

grade. I can read

and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
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from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act in Title 78 Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this ftf

day of August, 2008.

BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE
DEFENDANT

MHV
Deputy Duchesn

ty Attorney

Attorney for Defendant
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Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for Brian William Poundstone, the defendant above, and
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him. I have discussed it with him
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

Bar No. 9402
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case Brian William Poundstone,
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence
would support the conviction of defendant for the offenses for which the pleas are entered and fiiat
the acceptance of the pleas would serve the public interest.

Bar No. 10865
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, Ihe Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty pleas are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty pleas to the crimes set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

ft/

day of August, 20'

(
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Addendum D

STEPHANIE KUUIPO MIYA #9402
P.O. Box 711819
Salt Lake City, UT 84171
Telephone: 435/722-0770
Facsimile: 801/943-8693
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A TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. DEPARTMENT OF ROOSEVELT,
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

vs.

])
)
;
)

BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE,

;)

Case No.: 081000069

])

Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-1-6 and 77-13-6; and the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure Rule 11, Defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, by and through
his attorney of record, hereby moves this honorable court for an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Withdraw the "Guilty" pi. a Defendant entered before the court on August 14, 2008.
The Motion is based on the following:
Under Utah Rules of Crimin, 1 Procedure Rule 11 (e), the court may not accept a
defendant's "guilty" plea until the ccurt has found:
1. if the defendant is no represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and c 3es not desire counsel;
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2. the plea is voluntarily made;
3. the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering 1 he plea, these rights are waived;
4. A. the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those element beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
B. there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution
has sufficient evidenv d to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
5. the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory lature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
6. if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached;

7. the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
8. the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
Upon review of the audio recording of the entry of plea hearing on August 14, 2008,
Defendant was informed by the cour of the following, which the court referred to as "primary
rights" that Defendant was giving up by pleading "guilty:"
1. The court asked Defendant if he was aware that he did not have to enter a plea,
that he could have a jury trial, to which Defendant replied, "Yes;"
2. The court told Defendant his attorney could confront and cross examine the
state's witnesses at a trial;
3. The court told Defendant he could appeal a conviction at a trial;
4. The court told Defendant he could appear at his trial dressed in civilian clothing;
5. The court told Defendant that at his trial the jury would be instructed that if there
was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, the jury must vote not to
convict.
When the court asked the defendant if he understood each of the above-referenced rights
he was giving up, Defendant replied "Yes."
The court then went on to vdify that Defendant had read and understood the "Statement
of Defendant in Support of Guilty Piea and Certificate of Counsel," referred to by the court as
the "Affidavit." Defendant answere "Yes," he had read the document, understood the
document, and had gone over the document with his attorney. The court told Defendant that
o
J
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when he signed the affidavit, it would be placed into his file and would be notice to anyone who
read the file that Defendant was giving up the rights listed in the document. The court did not go
over the rights listed in the documer •, which are paraphrased as follows:
1. The plea is entered voluntarily by the defendant;
2. The defendant underrands that by pleading guilty he gives up the following rights
under the constitutions of the United States and Utah:
a. The right to counsel;
b. The nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which the defendant
is pleading gu'lty;
c. The defendants rights in this case and other cases, and the consequences
of his pleadin* guilty;
d. The right to a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury;
e. The right to c nfront and cross examine the state's witnesses;
f.

The right to h.*ve his own witnesses appear, and to compel the attendance
of those witnesses by subpoena if necessary;

g. The right to testify in his own behalf or not to testify at his trial;
h. The privilege against self-incrimination;
i. The presumpt ion of innocence;
j.

The state's bidden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the
crimes with M lich the defendant has been charged;

k. The jury verdict must be unanimous;

4
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1. The right to appeal the conviction.
The state offered the factual basis for the conviction; Defendant offered to the court his
disclaimer that, although he did not jgree with the facts as the state offered, he did agree that the
facts, as offered by the state, were the facts the state would rely on were the lawsuit to go to trial
The court then accepted the factual basis as offered by the state.
The court then advised Defendant that a conviction would be punished by a mandatory
term at the state prison of six, ten, or 15 years to life. Defendant then signed the affidavit in open
court. Defense counsel and counsel for the state also signed the affidavit.
The court then asked Defend nnt if he had any questions, to which Defendant replied,
"No." The court then asked Defendant how he pleads to count one of the Information, to which
Defendant answered, "Guilty." In accordance with the plea agreement, the court dismissed count
two, ordered a presentencing investigation report, inquired as to the necessity of a psychosexual
evaluation (the parties agreed that it was not necessary); and set sentencing on October 23, 2008,
at 1:30 PM.
Defendant claims that the co ..rt failed to inform him of the elements of the crime to
which he pleaded guilty; that the court failed to inform him that he would not be allowed to
appeal his conviction based upon hii. pleading guilty; that he could ask to have his guilty plea
withdrawn prior to his sentencing; aud that the court never established that Defendant's plea was
voluntarily entered.
Wherefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the court grant Defendant's motion to
withdraw his "guilty" plea based on :he court's failure to strictly comply with URCrP Rule 11 at
5
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the entry of plea hearing. Defendant claims that lack of strict compliance is plain error that will
result in manifest injustice if the plea is left to stand without first informing Defendant of all the
constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving at the hearing. Defense counsel avers that this
Motion is filed in good faith, at Defendant's direction, and prior to Defendant's sentence being
pronounced

i s ^ ^ c day of September, 2008.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

STEPHANIE KUUIPO MIYA
ktomeyfor Defendant

UbUii-J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEA was D mailed, first-class, postage prepaid
file in court clerk's office)

D FAXed

c^jThand-delivered (interoffice

to the party named below on the

^

day of

September, 2008.

Stephen D. Foote
Duchesne County Attorney
Grant H. Charles
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
P. O. Box 206
Duchesne, UT 84021
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Addendum E

EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT

ROOSEVELT

DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

p|L=E>

DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY UTMn

JUL 0 9 2010

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

BY.

CASE NO. 081000069

VS.

APPELLATE #: 20090597

BRIAN WILLIAM POUNDSTONE

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON
and EDWIN T. PETERSON
EIGHTH DISTRICT - ROOSEVELT
255 S. STATE STREET
ROOSEVELT, UTAH

84066

HEARINGS
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON
March 3, 13, 2008; April 10, 2008; May 8, 2008; June 5, 19,
2008; August 14, 200 8; October 20, 200 8; November 3, 2 008;
September 21, 2009; May 27, 2010

RLED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

ORIGINAL
Reported by:

Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

P R O C E E D I N G S
OCTOBER 2 0 ,

THE COURT:
Okay.

2008

Next case is Brian William Poundstone.

Brian William Poundstone is present in custody. MS.

Miya is his counsel.
Court has received and reviewed the report from Adult
Probation and Parole.

Ms. Miya, have you gone over this with

your client?
MS. MIYA:

I have, your Honor, but just a couple of

presentencing matters.

Mr. Poundstone asked me to file a

motion to have his guilty plea withdrawn and I was under the
understanding that's what we were going to be -- that motion is
before the Court right now, and Mr. Poundstone wanted to
address the Court to supplement the motion that I filed.

I

believe the State didn't file a response because it was set for
a hearing today.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, this is new to me.

I've

only seen it just today.
MS. MIYA:

Your Honor, the biggest issue, and I had

Ms. Wilson make an audio recording of uhe hearing, the plea
hearing so I could go over it and make sure that the colloquy
was in substantial compliance, your Honor, and it actually -you did a very good job going over the issues that had to be -that are required to be addressed.

Mr. Poundstone had some

comments to make to the Court as well that didn't involve
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

statutory problems, but the biggest issue on the withdrawal of
the guilty plea is that during all of the discussions that I
had with Mr. Poundstone, every time we talked about possible
sanctions, basically we were talking about six instead of six
to life.
I mean, I always said the 6, 10 or 15 and just in my
mind knew that to life was added on there, but Mr. Poundstone
says that he -- all he heard basically was 6, 10 or 15. And
because we had discussed the sentencing, the sanctions that
would be imposed at sentencing, Mr. Poundstone knew that there
was going to be a six year minimum, but he -- I guess -- I
don't know that it wasn't he didn't understand it, but because
I always talked about six and never just said -- I mean, I
didn't say six to life every time I talked about it, I think he
maybe felt -- was under the understanding that it was going to
be a six year prison sentence.
understanding was.

I think that's where his

So he asked to have his guilty plea

withdrawn because he did not understand that it was six to
life.
MR. CHARLES:
couldn't understand.

Your Honor, I don't know how he

He was advised of that several times from

the time of the initial appearance through the date that he
actually entered his plea.

And in the defense's motion, page 5

the second paragraph down it says the Court then advised
defendant that a conviction would be punished by a mandatory
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

term at the state prison of 6, 10 or 15 years to life.

I think

that - - I don' t know how we could have been more thorough in
saying that a sealing on this was life.

And so I see no basis

for the withdrawal of the plea and join in what Ms. Miya said
that I believe that the Court covered everything necessary
under Rule 11 in taking the plea.
MS. MIYA:

And just -- I know --

MR. CHARLES: And additionally, your Honor -- sorry.
If I could just finish.

Additionally, the affidavit states

that it's 6, 10, or 15 years to life.
THE COURT:

Which he read and signed.

MR. CHARLES:

Yeah, and acknowledged multiple times

that he understood that he didn't have to do that and that he
did understand the affidavit before he signed it.
MS. MIYA:

And, your Honor, just the very first time

that I was in court ever was when I was in my teens and I had
been arrested -- cited for making an improper U-turn.

And when

I went to court, the judge rattled off a whole bunch of things
to me and all I heard him say was five days in jail and a $3 5
fine so I know that there's -- it's hugely stressful to be in
court.

And even if you understand the English language, which

Mr. Poundstone absolutely understands, reads, writes and
understands the English language, but the stress factor, I
think, is something that even though you say yes I understand
what you're saying to me, it's not sinking in properly until
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

you have --he says basically when he got back to his room, he
went over the paperwork again where he's in a less stressful
environment than standing in front of the judge and realized
that it wasn't just a six year sentence, it was a six to life
and then he asked me to file the withdrawal.
And it's true, Mr. Charles is absolutely right,
several times from the beginning of this lawsuit Mr. Poundstone
has been advised, told, reminded that he was looking at
potentially a life sentence, but, again, every time I talked to
him I said six.

I didn't continue to re-enforce the 6 to life

and I just knew in my mind it was 6 to life and just assumed
that he was on the same track, on the same page that I was.
THE COURT:

Well, obviously I can't remember the

colloquy that took place prior to taking the defendant's plea.
And I don't have a Rule 11 form in front of me that I follow,
but where there's a possibility of a mandatory life sentence,
I'm usually very careful in that.

And I guess that -- I guess

that the standard here is was the defendant in a position where
he did not knowingly enter the plea.

And knowingly I guess

depends on whether the trial judge gave him the right
declaration of rights.
Now, Ms. Miya, as you indicated when you were in
court, the judge rattled off some things.
defendants are frightened.

I know that these

I know that iu's very fearful for

them and so I try and talk to them other than just reading a
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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Rule 11 dialogue.

I try and talk to them.

I try to look them

in the eye and talk to them, but yet we can't really tell if
he's got grounds for withdrawing the plea because I didn't
advise him of some of the stuff.

The only way I can do that is

to go ahead and deny your motion and have you make a record on
it, get a transcript and ask the appellate court about it. You
know, I don't feel like I need to do that.
On the other hand, I have a letter on the front of
the file from Mr. Poundstone and he's whining about counsel and
the fact that he couldn't communicate with you and you didn't
do a very good job, et cetera, et cetera.

That tells me that

he really wants to delay this and he really wants to grab at
any straw that's out there.

I think this is the practice when

people are put in the context of looking at a life sentence,
they whine about their attorney.
judge didn't do it right.

They are going to say the

They are going to say a lot of

things.
And I want to protect his rights, but your motion
here has not told me specifically how this has prejudiced him.
You're saying that plain error resulted in manifest injustice
if the plea is left to stand without first informing defendant
of all of the constitutional, statutory rights he was waiving
at the hearing.

I don't know what I said, but I'm usually

pretty careful on this kind of a case to do it right, but
that's not saying that I did.

I can't remember.

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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You understand, Mr. Poundstone, if we set this plea
aside, all of the charges in the Information will be reinstated
and you'll have a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

You understand that?

Yes.

Is that what you want to do?

THE DEFENDANT:

I believe that would be the best

interest for me because -THE COURT:

And you're not going to be able to pick a

lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Right.

You've got Ms. Miya?

THE DEFENDANT:

I understand that.

And there's

things that I looked at that my younger half brother during his
interview said, and part of that as I went over it, there's
part of the things that he's not saying and I realize that.
Now I know, I mean, my younger brother is about a year younger
than me and I know he's not very familiar with this stuff but.
THE COURT:

And you realize that there'll be greater

risk if all of the charges are reinstated?

You understand

that?
THE DEFENDANT:
MS. MIYA:

Yes, sir.

And, your Honor, I had two other clients

assigned to my caseload and Judge Payne's caseload that wrote
essentially the same letter to Judge Payne asking to have me
reassigned because I was incompetent and this is essentially
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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that same letter.

Mr. Poundstone was in the same pod as these

other two people.

I wasn't allowed -- I mean, Judge Payne did

not allow them to fire me, but because of subsequent
conversations that the two people had, I was allowed to
withdraw representation.

I just at this point don't really

feel like I can represent Mr. Poundstone properly at a trial if
you allow his guilty plea to be withdrawn simply because of the
people planning and -- the hearing that we had before Judge
Payne, your Honor, basically Mr. Poundstone hasn't really said
anything that's extremely horrible, but it sounds like from
this letter that he doesn't have confidence that I can
represent him properly and I just don't feel like that I'll be
able to do an adequate job in his eyes no matter what happens.
I just feel like I'm looking at either a malpractice
suit or a bar complaint and I wouldn't ask -- I don't want to
have that in my future, your Honor.
MR. CHARLES:

Your Honor, Ms. Miya already made a

motion to withdraw in this case once which we talked about in
chambers and it was denied, but I think that we're getting
sidetracked here.

The standard for the motion to withdraw the

plea is knowing and voluntary.

Mr. Poundstone confirmed

himself more than once when the plea was being taken and Ms.
Miya has cited it in her motion that he did understand.
I don't think that the word voluntarily necessarily
has to be used, but the Court asked him several times if he
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

understood that he didn't have to, explained to him what his
other options were, and then asked him if he wanted to enter
the plea and he said yes.

So although the Court didn't

specifically say are you doing it voluntarily, I think it's
obvious that he was.
And then on the knowing part, in the affidavit all of
the elements are stated.
that.

The Court asked him if he had read

In addition, he had been advised of the elements clear

back from the initial appearance and so that had been covered
more than once.

And so I would just submit to the Court, once

again, that there is no basis to withdraw the plea in this
motion.
THE COURT:

I can't really rule on whether I gave him

a good enough Rule 11 discussion without listening to the
recording.
MS. MIYA:

I have a copy of it, your Honor, if you

want to take it.
THE COURT:
MS. MIYA:

Has it been transcribed?
I just have the audio.

I just listened to

it myself.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'd like time to listen to that

because maybe I didn't do a good job.

If that's the case,

we'll start over, but I'd like to listen to it before I rule.
That's one of my obligations, although I always try,
particularly on a 5, 6 or 6, 10 to 15 to life situation I
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

27

usually try to.

I'm going to take this motion under advisement

and I guess the sentencing until I've had a chance to review
that.

Hopefully I can do that later today if you'll leave it

with my clerk, okay?
MS. MIYA:

Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor,

Mr. Poundstone, may he address the Court on the motion just -I think that Mr. Poundstone would like to be heard and it may
or may not have some bearing on your ruling.
THE COURT:

On the motion to withdraw his plea?

MS. MIYA: Yes.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. CHARLES:

Your Honor, could we take that under

advisement as well and hear it later.

I think that we're

getting sidetracked again here in that the knowing and
voluntarily is the standard.

I don't think it really matters

at this point what he has to say.
on the defense here.
adequate basis.

Additionally, the burden is

The motion, I believe, fails to state an

The Court is still offering to indulge them

and double check himself which is not required, but then
there's also case law stating that when the defendant signs the
affidavit and acknowledges that he understands, that the Court
doesn't even have to go through the Rule 11 colloquy on the
record and there's no question that happened here.
THE COURT:
to the law.

Well, that's never been my understanding

What's the date of that case?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

MR. CHARLES:
THE COURT:

Could we have some time to brief it?

Sure. Yeah.

MR. CHARLES: Do we just want to put this back on
calendar in two weeks?
THE COURT:

I think that's what we should do.

I'll

listen to the dialogue and just give me some brief law then,
Mr. Charles.
MR. CHARLES: Okay.
THE COURT:
again.

Ms. Miya's brief is here.

I'll read it

Let me consider this and I'll rule on it our next day

here which will be November 3rd.
MS. MIYA:

And, your Honor, if this is going to serve

as Mr. Charles' response to the motion, may I have at least a
couple of days to look at it and review it and get an adequate
basis for arguments?
THE COURT:

Sure.

Sure.

Yeah, let's try and get it

done in two weeks, before two weeks. We won't even consider
the matter of allowing you to withdraw yet.

I'm starting to

get letters from folks in the same blocks over there in the
jail and I'm not paying a lot of attention to them.
MS. MIYA:
THE COURT:
MS. MIYA:

Is it a 1:30 hearing?
Pardon me?
Is that hearing 1:30?

Thank you, your

Honor.
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
NOVEMBER 3 ,

THE COURT:

Okay.

200 8

On for sentencing is Brian

Poundstone.
MS. MIYA:

And, your Honor, before we do sentencing

on Mr. Poundstone, we still have to deal with his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
THE COURT:

Yes, actually I don't know if we can

resolve that today or not.

I was waiting for a memoranda of

brief.
MS. MIYA:

Right.

Mr. Charles was going to

(inaudible.)
THE COURT:

Mr. Charles, the way we left this was

that you were going to prepare a brief to support your position
on Ms. Miya's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
MR. CHARLES:

That's correct.

And the point that I

was going to brief is whether or not the affidavit in support
of guilty plea could satisfy the Rule 11 requirement.

The way

I started the research on that was just by rereading the rule
and realized that the language I was looking for is in the rule
itself where it says, These findings may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record or if used a written
statement, reciting these factors after the Court has
established that the defendant has read, understood and
acknowledged the contents of the statement.
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In Ms. Miya's motion on page 3 it states, The Court
went on to verify defendant had read and understood the
statement of defendant in support of guilty plea.

And I

believe that the Court would have a copy of the statement in
support of guilty plea in the file.

That was the only issue

that I intended to brief.

I didn't feel like it was necessary

after rereading the rule.

I thought I could just point the

language out to the Court and would submit on that.
THE COURT:
MS. MIYA:

Okay.

Ms. Miya.

Your Honor, the case law on the Rule 11

colloquy, as you are painfully aware, is that it requires
strict compliance with the rule, not just substantial
compliance.

You were going to listen to the audio of the

hearing to make sure that you covered everything that was
supposed to be covered properly.

And, again, the Supreme Court

of the State of (inaudible) has absolutely said that we're not
going to set up a script that the trial judge has to go through
to make sure there's strict compliance.
I think that you're in a position through your
questioning co determine whether or not the person you're
speaking to understands what's happening to him.

I listened to

the hearing audio and I really think that, first of all, that
you did -- I think you did a really good job on your colloquy.
I think that you asked every question that needed to be asked.
At the time Mr. Poundstone understood what was happening to
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him.

What he didn't understand, again, what his -- and, your

Honor, if you'll recall, when we set the hearing to take
Mr. Poundstone's guilty plea, it was in your chambers and you
absolutely already agreed on the sentencing recommendations
that Mr. Charles and I had agreed on which would be your
imposing a 6 to life instead of the 10 or 15.
And, again, Mr. Poundstone understood that he was not
going to be sentenced to 10 to life or 15 to life, but he was
going to get the six.

But, once again, I didn't always every

time I spoke with him say 6 to life, 6 to life.

I always

talked about the six years, but I didn't add the to life on
there just knowing in my mind that it was 6 to life. And
Mr. Poundstone really, really at the time did not understand
that it was a 6 to life and not just a six year prison
sentence.

That's really the basis for the motion to have his

guilty plea withdrawn.
He was really under the understanding that it was a
six year prison sentence and then he would be done.

And he

didn't really until he had a chance after everything was over
to sit in his room and really study the paperwork and read all
his papers and he thought he understood everything, but
apparently he didn't and asked me to file a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea on that point alone.
THE COURT:

It would be my practice to be very

careful about those at the first appearance hearing.
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be pretty unclear as to how someone given the first appearance
hearing and the exposure of the sentences that were possible to
go through a case like this for the time period he's gone
through it talking to counsel, so on and so forth, that that
really would be something that he would not understand.
(Someone is shuffling papers in the microphone and
the Judge cannot be heard.)
I don't know if there is case law on the -- well, on
the basis of what I have before me, Ms. Miya, I'm going to deny
your motion.

I think the guilty plea was given knowingly and

that he was aware of it. We had spoken in chambers about him
taking the six to life rather than the 10 to 15 to life. And
for his Information, if he does what he's supposed to do and
gets into the sex abuse counseling and is a good student and
proceeds and follows all the rules, he might get out under six
years.

In fact, they have the authority to let him out sooner

than that.

It's up to him.

The Board of Pardons, if they want, can let him out
in two, but I'm not going to allow you to withdraw your plea so
we need to set a sentencing date.
MS. MIYA:

And then that brings up, again, whether or

not it would be appropriate for me to continue and be
Mr. Poundstone's attorney at his sentencing when he's already
indicated to the Court that he was -THE COURT:

I usually rely on counsel on that, Ms.
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